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We think of the Constitution in the singular. We speak of it as
"the" Constitution. We carry the illusion that it is a self-contained docu-
ment expressing internally consistent theories and values of one group of
draftsmen-the "Founding Fathers." But the more familiar one be-
comes with its history the more evident it is that "the" Constitution is, in
fact, a collection of several Constitutions.
The First Constitution was proclaimed in September of 1787, the
work of fifty-five men who gathered periodically in Philadelphia from
May until September to propose a new and unique plan of government.
Though they feared democracy, agreeing with Homer that "Ill fares it
where the multitude hath sway," they accepted some-but not too
much-democracy in their plan. Likewise, they accepted some executive
power, but not on the model of King George.
They proposed that the sovereign states should surrender a portion
of their sovereignty to a new central authority, one limited in scope by
the expressed terms of the Constitution-spelled out somewhat in the
nature of a contract. Thus, a two-headed creature was envisioned-the
national part controlling common interests, such as war, foreign affairs,
and interstate commerce, and the states retaining the general police
power respecting the health, welfare and morals of the people. Individ-
ual rights, for the most part, were left to the protection of state
constitutions.
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law. A.B. 1933, University of Arkansas;
J.D. 1936, University of Chicago; LL.D. 1963, University of Arkansas; LL.D. 1992, Tulane
University. The footnotes to this Essay have been moved into the text at the Author's rea-
soned request, and therefore do not conform to the Bluebook.
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The plan also divided the national power between the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary. Within the legislature, the basic law-making
body, a further split was established between the Senate and the House.
The states were given equal power in the Senate, two senators for each
state, whereas the House granted representation from the states on the
basis of population.
Both houses were required to agree in order to enact a law, thereby
giving each a veto over the other. Each checked and balanced the other,
with compromise obviously essential.
The executive power, bestowed after some debate on one person,
included the authority to administer the federal laws, to conduct foreign
affairs, to appoint leading officials, and to exercise substantial war power
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, though only Congress
could declare war. The executive power was also restrained by provi-
sions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate in the making of
treaties and the appointment of "Officers of the United States."
These legislative controls on the executive were equalled or ex-
ceeded by the executive's power to veto laws passed by the legislature.
Though such vetoes could be overcome by a two-thirds vote of each leg-
islative house, this proved to be very difficult.
The power of the Supreme Court, particularly as a checking or bal-
ancing force on the legislature, the executive, or the states, was worded
with such obvious ambiguity that it may be regarded as studied. Article
Three provided that the judicial power would extend to all cases "arising
under" the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States. Did
these vague words grant the power to nullify a law that the Court found
contrary to the Constitution?
When the Constitution was written in 1787, some state supreme
courts had asserted such a power in cases involving a violation of state
constitutions. The "Founding Fathers" were well aware of this fact and
evidence indicates that some of them favored similar federal judicial au-
thority. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); John D.
Hicks, A Short History of American Democracy 124 (1943). But Article
Three spoke in obscure terms. Perhaps the fear of state opposition in the
ratification process to such federal judicial power prompted the use of
this unclear choice of words, leaving the resolution of the issue to the
future. Indeed, the "future" occurred without much delay, when the
avowed Federalist, Chief Justice John Marshall, successfully asserted the
power on behalf of the Court in 1803, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Even this brief review of the structure of government laid out in the
First Constitution should make obvious the basic direction of the Phila-
delphia meeting. For good reason and on the basis of personal experi-
ence, the Founding Fathers had a healthy fear of the power of
government, including the power of the new federal leviathan that they
were creating. Borrowing the theories of Locke and Montesquieu, their
basic idea was to control the dangerous power of government, and the
persons possessing it, by dividing it into many parts, and by separating
the persons holding the power and giving them partial authority that
they could use only with the concurrence of other persons also holding
partial power. As James Madison explained in The Federalist Nos. 47
and 48, the First Constitution was designed to provide a system of checks
and balances requiring concurrence and compromise in the exercise of
power. It was not a plan for fast and efficient action and change. It was
a plan for the maintenance of the status quo, a plan for conservation of
existing interests, particularly the interests of those holding property and
position. It was a plan that strongly sustained the values of those at Phil-
adelphia, who initially would dominate the new positions of influence.
According to the plan, in order to change the status quo, to make a
new law or to change or repeal an existing one, many hurdles had to be
surmounted. Many interests and points of view had to be satisfied. For
example, if a majority of the House, representing the population, voted
for a new law, the Senate, representing the states, had to agree. More-
over, the President was given the veto power, thereby checking the will
of both the House and Senate. In turn, the plan allowed the House and
the Senate to adopt the law, thereby checking the veto, if each of them
mustered a two-thirds override vote. In this system of checks and bal-
ances, failure to cross any one hurdle prevented the proposed change.
Thus, control of any one of the divided powers could be used to thwart
the will of all the others. Those favoring the status quo had a significant
tactical advantage.
Lord Acton observed that power corrupts, and that absolute power
corrupts absolutely. Those at Philadelphia in 1787 clearly agreed. While
they could not avoid the necessity of governmental power, including
democratic power, they could lessen the danger by splitting that power
among different people and by providing checks and balances even to the
exercise of the separated authority. The plan was not an original idea,
but it was perhaps an original application of the theory in a major gov-
ernmental structure.
The plan has three main weaknesses, as current United States poli-
tics reveals. First, it has a tendency to create a deadlock when govern-
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mental action is needed. Second, it permits each branch to avoid
responsibility by charging that the other branches are the cause of gov-
ernmental inaction and failure. Third, it leaves the door open for polit-
ical demagoguery, the Achilles' heel of democracy.
This, in brief, is the First Constitution, consisting of only seven
short Articles and designed primarily to establish a framework of govern-
ment. It dealt mainly with the procedure of government, rather than the
content. Its mission was a narrow one: To establish a new limited na-
tional government, while recognizing the continuing reserved sovereignty
of the states; and to apply the theories of Locke and Montesquieu in
order to block the corruption of governmental power, by separating it
among various people and bodies and carefully checking even the use of
partial power in various hands.
When asked to ratify the new government, however, some of the
states responded with fear of the new central authority. To pacify them,
the Federalists agreed to adopt amendments to the original structure.
Whereas the First Constitution of 1787 was primarily a grant of power to
the new national leviathan, the Amendments-the Second Constitu-
tion-were exactly the opposite. The Bill of Rights, adopted in 1791, set
forth both substantive and procedural limits. For example, the First
Amendment ensured that Congress could make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion or prohibiting its free exercise. It provided that
Congress could not abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press. In the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, due process of law was required,
along with specific protections in criminal cases particularly of a proce-
dural nature.
A Bill of Rights had been given serious consideration at Philadel-
phia but, when put to a vote of the states, failed for want of a majority.
The vote was five states for, and five states against. See The Debates in
the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the
United States: Reported by James Madison 545 (Gaillard Hunt & James
Brown Scott eds., 1920). Thus, the explicit declaration of a Bill of Rights
to shield individuals and the states from the Federalists constituted a
Second Constitution, one with different intent than the First and drafted
and sponsored by different people. One must therefore qualify the usual
credit given the "Founding Fathers" for the magnificent Bill of Rights.
They had rejected it. It was the work of a different set of "Founding
Fathers."
For Americans who were alive between 1791 and 1865, the two
Constitutions remained relatively unchanged, the First granting power to
the federal government, and the Second limiting it.
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By around 1860, the issue of the right of the states to withdraw from
the Union gradually became a fighting one. In time, the sin of slavery
coupled with economic tensions between the North and the South pro-
voked the outbreak of the Civil War. Tragically, neither of the two Con-
stitutions contained provisions clearly governing the secession problem.
But with the victory of the North, national power over the states was
established by force and unity was maintained. The results of the victory
were reduced to writing and added to the existing two Constitutions in
the form of the Thirteenth Amendment, in 1865, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, in 1868, and the Fifteenth Amendment, in 1870.
These "Civil War Amendments" became another American Consti-
tution. They marked the death knell of strong state sovereignty, so
plainly sought and recognized in the cautious grant of limited power to
the federal government in 1787. This new Constitution added great
power to the national government, facilitating the domination of all the
states, not just the South. Thus it can be fairly said that a Third Consti-
tution was adopted, one differing greatly from the restrained federalism
of the First Constitution, one drafted by different "Founding Fathers"
than those at Philadelphia in 1787 or the other "Founding Fathers" who
demanded the Second Constitution of 1791.
Are three Constitutions enough? Well, one would think so and, for
many years, this writer in the classroom confined his analysis to three.
Yet, as one studies the matter, it becomes increasingly evident that there
is at least one more.
The source of this Fourth Constitution is strange indeed. It is the
creation of the Supreme Court, and is based on the "due process" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as it has been defined since 1890 by the
Court.
In this regard, it is helpful first to point out that the Fourteenth
Amendment actually confines its grant of new power to the Congress.
The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly states that "The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." Nothing whatever within the Amendment suggests that the
Supreme Court should wield this new control over the nation. And yet
today it is mainly the Supreme Court that governs all of us under the
Amendment. In fact, the Supreme Court governs even the Congress it-
self, in contradiction of the Amendment's declaration that "The Con-
gress shall have power to enforce" the Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment ostensibly was aimed primarily at free-
dom and equality for the former slaves. The Thirteenth Amendment,
abolishing slavery, and the Fifteenth, granting the right to vote to black
April 1993]
men (no women, black or white, were enfranchised), assisted this goal.
But the language of the Fourteenth Amendment was so broad and so
ambiguous that it contained the seed of a greatly extended federal power
over all the states, going far beyond insuring freedom for the slaves in the
South. Some historians have asserted that this was, indeed, a secret ob-
jective, a conspiracy, of the draftsmen in Congress. See Howard Jay
Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47
Yale L.J. 371 (1938).
Whether the conspiracy theory is true or false, it is now evident that
the Supreme Court has gradually extended federal power over the states
and the people by its interpretation of the words of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In doing so, the Court has relied primarily on the words of
the Due Process Clause.
Initially, lawyers relied primarily on the "privileges and immuni-
ties" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in seeking to extend the
Amendment beyond the protection of African-Americans. The first ma-
jor effort to extend the Fourteenth Amendment was in the famous
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Lawyers urged the
Supreme Court to protect butchers of all races from state legislation in
Louisiana granting a monopoly favoring slaughter houses that severely
limited the freedom of butchers to pursue their means of livelihood. On
its face, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Amendment was
broad enough to authorize federal protection over all "privileges and im-
munities," regardless of race.
The majority of the Court refused to accept such an interpretation.
They said that the Amendment's draftsmen could not possibly have in-
tended such an interpretation because it would destroy the basic plan of
the First Constitution, a plan designed to maintain strong reserved power
in the states, while granting only limited power to the federal govern-
ment. They rightly recognized that the broad language of the new
amendment, if generously interpreted, could subject the states to greatly
increased federal control, a fear that subsequent history has fully
justified.
Four members of the Court dissented. Justice Field's dissenting
opinion strongly and persuasively supported the "privileges and immuni-
ties" clause as the proper words of protection against the state-created
monopoly. While joining Field's opinion, two of the dissenters, Justices
Bradley and Swayne, urged their colleagues also to use the "due process"
clause as the words giving the protection to the butchers.
The majority opinion not only insisted on maintaining the original
plan of divided sovereignty between the states and the nation, but also
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prophesied that the Amendment would always be confined to the protec-
tion of African-Americans, which they said was its original intended pur-
pose. If the Fourteenth Amendment were truly intended to greatly
extend federal power over the states, the "privileges and immunities"
clause would appear to be the proper constitutional words to effect this
revolutionary change. Justice Field made this abundantly clear in his
sharp dissent. But the majority of the Court, using questionable reason-
ing, rejected such an interpretation and thereby nullified substantially the
potential use of the privileges and immunities clause. This nullification
prevails to this day.
The two dissenters, who stressed the due process clause as the words
intended to revolutionize federalism, adopted an interpretation of "due
process of law" that flatly contradicted the historic purpose and meaning
of these words. In fact, the majority opinion, which gave scant attention
to the "due process" argument, rightly declared that such an interpreta-
tion had never before been accepted by the Supreme Court, even though
the Second Constitution had contained a "due process" limit on the fed-
eral government since 1791. See U.S. Const., amend. V.
The historic meaning of "due process" was the requirement that the
trial of cases and parties be in accordance with the "due procedure" of
the law. It was not intended to require "due substance of law," such as
the substantive right of butchers to be free from a state-imposed monop-
oly within their trade. See Edward S. Corwin, Liberty Against Govern-
ment (1948).
Initially, Justice Field placed no emphasis on the use of the due pro-
cess clause and apparently accepted the refusal of the majority to give it a
meaning that was historically unsound. But Justice Field evidently
wanted to find constitutional grounds upon which to base federal judicial
protection of business and commercial interests from state laws that, in
some cases, hindered the great expansion of the nation to the West, Jus-
tice Field's home base.
So, lo and behold, Justice Field abandoned his impressive and per-
haps correct reading of the privileges and immunities clause as the basis
for federal judicial protection of substantive rights and adopted the posi-
tion of his fellow dissenters, Justices Bradley and Swayne, that the due
process clause was the correct instrument. Perhaps he reached the prag-
matic conclusion that the best opportunity to gain a majority of the
Court on the matter was to join forces with the two members of the
Court who were so strongly in favor of erecting "due process" as the
barrier to undesired state regulation.
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What followed is a remarkable incident in the history of the
Supreme Court. For a period of seventeen years, the majority held firmly
to its limited and correct interpretation of the due process clause, while
Justice Field, in one dissent after another, insisted that the due process
clause gave the federal courts the power to hold unconstitutional state
laws that the Court found unacceptable as to substance, as well as to
procedure.
Finally, in 1890, in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Min-
nesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), Justice Field's persistence was rewarded
when he succeeded in gaining a majority vote interpreting due process as
giving the Court the power to rule on the constitutionality of the sub-
stance, as well as the procedure, of state laws. With one master stroke of
constitutional misinterpretation, Justice Field and his colleagues gave the
Supreme Court the power to invalidate state laws whenever it found the
substance of a state law "unreasonable."
The due process clause was thus converted into the instrument for a
radically new domination of the states by the federal government. And
the possessor of this power was not the Congress, as specified by section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court. Justice Wil-
liam 0. Douglas referred to the due process clause as the "wild card" in
the hand of the Supreme Court. See William 0. Douglas, The Bill of
Rights Is Not Enough, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 207, 219 (1963). Justice Hugo
Black complained that substantive due process allows the Court to
"roam at will" in the exercise of power, quoting Justice Holmes who
stated that there is "hardly any limit but the sky" to this judicial power.
Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 600 n.3
(1942) (quoting Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930)).
Having wrought this judicial miracle in the assumption of federal
and judicial control over the states, the Court went on, in time, to inter-
pret the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to give the Supreme
Court the same supervisory authority over the other branches of the fed-
eral government, including the President and the Congress itself. By vir-
tue of this single judicial power-play, the Court's use of the due process
clause over a period of years has led to the imposition of virtually all of
the Bill of Rights on the states. Even though many will conclude that the
practical result has been a good one, others will insist that the result,
though desirable, has come about through an abuse of judicial power.
The Fourth Constitution, then, is the due process clause as inter-
preted by the justices-a reconstruction of the basic frame and structure
of United States government of revolutionary proportions. This Fourth
Constitution is another constitution, written by different "Founding Fa-
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
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thers" than those of the First, or the Second, or the Third Constitution;
written in a different time; written for different and at times conflicting
purposes.
And most striking of all, written by judges.
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